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ABSTRACT: In 2019 the Supreme Court held in Rucho v. Common Cause
that challenges in federal court to partisan gerrymandering were
nonjusticiable political questions. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Chief
Justice John Roberts expressed concern that frequently deciding such
cases would politicize the Court itself. Such expressions seem to fit
well within the characterization of the Chief Justice as an
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institutionalist concerned with the legitimacy and reputation of the
federal courts. This article addresses how the unique design and
procedures of gerrymandering litigation in federal courts ought to
inform such institutional loyalty arguments. Those features include
that such cases are litigated before three-judge district courts, with a
direct, mandatory appeal available to the Supreme Court. Large
numbers of amicus curiae briefs by individuals and organizations
with partisan leanings have also characterized such litigation in the
Supreme Court. The article argues that these unique features
themselves should be given greater emphasis in assessing whether
Chief Justice Roberts; institutionalist concerns are well-founded.
INTRODUCTION

2

11/10/2020 10:33:17

Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
See, e.g., Case Comment, Article III—Justiciability—Political Question Doctrine—Rucho
v. Common Cause, 133 HARV. L. REV. 252 (2019) (discussing the political question
doctrine after Rucho).
3 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 Geo. L.J.
Online 51 (2020) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent decisions look partisan);
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court, 2019 Sup. Ct. Rev. 111 (same).
1
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In 2019 the United States Supreme Court held in Rucho v.
Common Cause 1 that partisan gerrymandering claims brought in
federal court were nonjusticiable political questions. The case was
highly publicized and resulted in a much discussed 5-4 decision,
with Chief Justice John Roberts writing for the majority, and Justice
Elena Kagan writing for the dissenters. Doctrinal analysis has
focused on the Court’s application of the venerable political question
doctrine.2 In addition, the result was frequently analyzed in largely
ideological or partisan terms, 3 since all Justices appointed by
Republican Presidents made up the majority, while all Justices in the
dissent had been appointed by Democratic Presidents.
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Another focus of the commentary was the Court’s concern with
the effect of adjudicating such cases on the perceived partisanship
and legitimacy of the Court itself. The Court, after canvassing the
various proposed ways to identify unlawful partisan gerrymanders,
and finding that they “pose[d] basic questions that are political, not
legal,” 4 expressed concern that the plaintiffs were seeking “an
unprecedented expansion of judicial power… into one of the most
intensely partisan aspects of American political life.” 5 “That
intervention,” the Court continued, “would be unlimited in scope
and duration—it would recur over and over again around the
country with each new round of districting.”6 This concern accords
with the frequent characterization of the Chief Justice as an
institutionalist, concerned with maintaining as much as possible the
putatively nonpartisan nature and perception of the Court. 7
Recently David Fontana and Aziz Z. Huq have mapped out how
judges and other public officials make decisions based, in whole or

Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
Id. at 2507.
6 Id.
7 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2243 (2019) (book review) (discussing the widespread assumption that the Chief
Justice “reportedly switched his vote on the individual mandate [in the Obamacare
case, Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012)] in order to safeguard the
Supreme Court’s reputation.”) (footnote omitted). See also Peter Baker, Trump, in India,
Demands 2 Liberal Justices Recuse Themselves From His Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2020,
archived at https://perma.cc/5JVG-UF8Q (recounting how Roberts stated that “[w]e
do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges,”
responding to criticism of an “Obama judge” by President Trump) (internal quotes
omitted); Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Supreme Court Confronts Trump’s Challenge to the
Separation of Powers, THE NEW YORKER, May 2, 2020, archived at
https://perma.cc/3L3Q-38SA (“For those at the top of the judicial branch, there is a
motivation that is greater than partisanship: the desire to retain the perception of
legitimacy that is most crucial to maintenance of its power.”); Jeffrey Rosen, John
Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, THE ATLANTIC, July 13, 2020, archived at
https://perma.cc/U5YN-RCVF (stating that Roberts “would make it his highest
priority to protect the Court’s institutional legitimacy.”).
4
5
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in part, on such institutional loyalties. 8 The “behavior of federal
officials,” they argue, “cannot always be explained simply by
partisan or ideological motives.” 9 Instead, it can sometimes be
attributed to an official’s “psychological proclivity” to act in a way
that the official perceives to be in the best interest of her home
institution. 10 These loyalties, they continue, are not ends in
themselves: “[r]ather, they play a foundational role in sometimes
helping, and sometimes hindering, the realization of otherwise
normatively desirable constitutional ends.” 11 Normatively, some
notion of that loyalty is justifiable as an implicit, if not explicit,
component of the separation of powers, as originally conceived by
the Framers to be “a central dynamo of branch autonomy and healthy
interbranch friction.” 12 Again referring to Chief Justice Roberts,
Fontana and Huq say that in some of his decisions, “[s]tandard
ideological or attitudinal models of judicial behavior do not offer
straightforward explanation[s]” for his votes. 13 Institutional loyalty
can also be deployed to explain, at least in part, Roberts’ concern with
what he would consider to be the perceived politicization of the
federal judiciary were it to frequently decide partisan
gerrymandering cases.14
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David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1 (2018).
9 Id. at 5.
10 Id. at 8.
11 Id. at 10.
12 Id. at 3 (referring to, among other things, arguments by James Madison in The
Federalist 51). See also Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not
Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2318 (2006) (making similar arguments).
13 Fontana & Huq, supra note 8, at 6. They are particularly referencing his vote in the
2012 Obamacare case. Id. at 5-6.
14 See, e.g., David Cole, Keeping Up Appearances, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 2019, at 1819 (“And while there is much to criticize in Robert’s gerrymandering decision . . . , the
strongest prudential argument in his favor is the risk that, if courts start reviewing
such claims, they would be dragged into the partisan muck.”)
8
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15 Richard H. Pildes, Institutional Formalism and Realism in Constitutional and Public Law,
2013 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
16 Id. at 2.
17 Id. Relevant to the present topic, Pildes gives as an example of institutional realism
the federal courts, in the reapportionment revolution in the 1960s, at least implicitly
taking into account the fact that until that time, many state legislatures failed to redraw
malapportioned legislative districts. Id. at 36-37.
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That explanation seems to carry considerable force, but in this
Article I go a step further, and explore how the unique design and
procedures of federal court litigation of these claims affected the
institutional loyalty that apparently concerned the Chief Justice. To
make the same point in a slightly different way, I borrow from
Richard Pildes’ distinction between courts using institutional
formalism and institutional realism. 15 In the former, a court analyzes
an institution at a “high level of abstraction and generality” in
constitutional and public law.16 In contrast, doctrine that engages in
realism “penetrate[s] the institutional black box” to take into account
“how these institutions actually function in, and over, time.” 17 My
aim here is not to engage in doctrinal analysis as such. Instead, I will
focus on and unpack the black box of the federal court adjudicative
system itself, to better understand and evaluate how institutional
loyalty came to play a role in the disposition of Rucho.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the three-judge
district court, with its unusual mechanism of direct appeals to the
Supreme Court, which is the required forum for adjudication of
apportionment and gerrymandering claims, partisan, racial, or
otherwise. This Part considers the history of that court; the
implications of Congress restricting in 1976 the jurisdiction of that
court to only apportionment claims; and whether the direct appeal
option should be considered as restricting the percolation of appeals
to the Court or otherwise unduly negatively impacting adjudication
at the Court itself. Part II of the Article will focus on how the legal
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profession, interest groups, and the other branches of government
sought to influence the Court’s decision in Rucho, and prior similar
cases, especially through the use of amicus curiae briefs. 18 The
conclusion considers the implication of Parts I and II for possible
future adjudication of partisan gerrymandering claims, and proposes
that the institutional concerns in the context arguably relied upon by
some members of the Court themselves be reexamined.
I. THE THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT AND DIRECT APPEALS OF
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING SUITS
Rucho v. Common Cause 19 decided two direct appeals from
separate three-judge district court decisions. One held that
Congressional districts drawn by the Republican-controlled state
legislature in North Carolina unlawfully favored the Republican
party. 20 The other held that Congressional districts drawn by a
Democratic-controlled state legislature in Maryland unlawfully
favored the Democratic party.21 The Supreme Court remanded both
cases without reaching the merits, and ordered that they be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.22

The culmination of the litigation in Rucho builds on the rich and
colorful history of the three-judge district court in the federal system.
Congress created the court in 1910 23 as a reaction to the then-

19
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See Fontana & Huq, supra note 8, at 9.
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).
20 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp.3d 587 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (three-judge court).
21 Lamone v. Benisek, 348 F. Supp.3d 493 (D. Md. 2018) (three-judge court).
22 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2508.
23 Act of June 19, 1910 § 266, 36 Stat. 1100.
18
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DISCONTENTS
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controversial decision of Ex parte Young,24 which made it easier for
corporations to sue in federal court to seek injunctions against the
enforcement of Progressive Era legislation. Congress required that
rather than the usual litigation before a single district judge with
normal appellate review thereafter, when such injunctive relief was
sought against state statutes for constitutional violations, a threejudge trial court was convened, consisting of the district judge before
whom the suit was filed, and two other judges (at least one of whom
must be a circuit judge) appointed by the Chief Judge of the Circuit.
A direct appeal of that court’s decision could be had to the Supreme
Court. The rationale for the court was that such suits were considered
especially controversial and important, and that they would be better
adjudicated, and therefore better accepted by the public, if decided
by three judges rather than one. The direct appeal mechanism was
meant to ensure accelerated review by the Supreme Court. 25
While originally framed as a brake against a purportedly activist
federal judiciary holding state laws unconstitutional, this rationale
was turned on its head by litigators four decades later. During the
1950s and 60s, some litigators in civil rights cases, particularly
though not only in southern states, found three-judge district courts
to be more hospitable to their actions as compared to district judges

25
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Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
For further discussions of the establishment and early history of the three-judge
district court, see OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 18881910, at 211-20 (1993) (Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court); BARRY
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 184-85 (2009);
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District
Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 111-18 (2008) [hereinafter Solimine, Congress]. Congress
expanded the jurisdiction of the court in 1937 to include constitutional challenges by
civil plaintiffs to federal statutes, Solimine, supra, at 124-25, and still later vested a
three-judge district court in the District of Columbia with exclusive jurisdiction to hear
declaratory judgment actions by certain state and local governments affected by the
preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Id. at 132-33.
24
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acting alone. They also favored the prospect of direct appeals to the
relatively friendly confines of the Warren Court. 26 Coincidentally or
not, large numbers of three-judge district courts were convened each
year in the 1960s and 70s (up to over 300 a year in the latter decade),27
a function largely of increased civil rights litigation. 28
While favored by some civil rights litigators, at the same time the
three-judge district court fell out of favor in other quarters. A
formidable array of critics marshalled several arguments in favor of
limiting the jurisdiction of, or simply abolishing, the court.
Prominent federal judges, lawyers and academics found it
awkwardly and administratively burdensome to assemble three
judges to hear a case that, as they saw it, could and should be decided
by a single judge, with normal appellate review thereafter. 29 The
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26 On the increased targeting of three-judge district courts by civil rights litigators, see
Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 126-31.
27 Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 79, 137 (1996) (tbl.1) (data drawn from the Annual Reports of the
Administration office of the United States Courts documenting sharp increase in threejudge district court hearings from 1964 to 1977, especially in civil rights and
reapportionment cases) [hereinafter Solimine, Voting Rights].
28 On the increase in civil rights litigation in this period, brought by interest groups
(e.g., the ACLU and NAACP), increasingly numbers of lawyers, and facilitated by
changes in substantive and procedural law, see SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE:
PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 5 (2010); Carl Tobias, Public
Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 279-85
(1989); Stephen C. Yeazell, Brown, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Silent Litigation
Revolution, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1975, 1991-2000 (2004).
29 See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 316-21 (1969) (arguing that federalism concerns that
motivated the establishment of the court were no longer paramount, and that the court
should be abolished for constitutional challenges to federal statutes, but left intact for
such challenges to state statutes, albeit only when requested by the defendant)
[hereinafter ALI STUDY]; FED. JUD. CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE
CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, 57 F.R.D. 573, 596-99 (1972) (Freund Report); David
P. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1964) (arguing against a general rule for three judge panels in constitutional
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Supreme Court overtly criticized the burgeoning direct appeals from
the courts as an unnecessary exception to the usual certiorari
process.30 Responding to these criticisms, in the 1970s the Senate and
House Judiciary Committee began considering legislation to limit or
eliminate the court. The proposals encountered little resistance, other
than from the NAACP, which argued that the court was still
necessary because of the possible parochialism of federal judges
sitting alone, particularly in sensitive civil rights cases. Those
arguments were rejected, and the debate was framed almost
exclusively in terms of non-ideological administrative efficiency,
deferring to the expertise of the proponents.31 Legislation abolishing
the three-judge district court, with one exception, passed in 1976.32
The exception is relevant to this Article. It states that the court
still must be convened for constitutional challenges to the
“apportionment” of Congressional districts or statewide legislative
bodies.33 The rationale for this exception is not clear. Some stalwart
critics of the three-judge district court nonetheless allowed that the
periodic court challenges to the decennial redrawing of legislative
districts, necessitated by the Reapportionment Revolution initiated
by Baker v. Carr,34 was a potential source of notable friction between
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litigation). See generally Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 137-40 (discussing views
of judges, academics and lawyers).
30 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90, 98-99 (1974)
(criticizing the direct appeals process as serving no real policy objective); Swift & Co.
v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1965) (same). See generally Solimine, Congress, supra
note 25, at 135-37, 139-41 (discussing views of the Justices).
31 Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 141-48 (discussion of legislative activity in the
1970s, including opposition by the NAACP). See also Carolyn Shapiro, Docket Control,
Mandatory Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Failure in Rucho v. Common Cause, 2020
Wis. L. Rev. 301, 309-13 (overview of the legislative background to the
reapportionment exception) [hereinafter Shapiro, Docket Control].
32 Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, 90 Stat. 1119.
33 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).
34 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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federal judges and state officials.35 The American Law Institute (ALI)
argued that in these instances the “moral authority of a federal court
order is likely to be maximized if the result cannot be laid to the
prejudices or political ambitions of a single district judge.” 36 No less
than iconic federal appellate judges Henry Friendly and J. Skelly
Wright, while endorsing the abolishment of the court, similarly
supported a reapportionment exception, given what they saw as the
importance of these cases, their legal and factual complexity that
would benefit from three judges at trial, and the necessity of “public
acceptance” of the decisions.37
The official legislative history does not shed much light on these
arguments. In addressing the exception, it refers in an unelaborated
way to the “importance” of reapportionment cases. 38 But we can
reasonably infer that members of Congress perceived that Baker and
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35 See, e.g., Case Note, The Three-Judge Court Reassessed: Changing Roles in Federal-State
Relationships, 72 YALE L.J. 1646, 1660 (1963) (explaining how reapportionment altered
court dynamics). See generally Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 144-45 (same).
36 ALI STUDY, supra note 29, at 320. It continues: “In matters of such great public
moment, the burden on the federal judicial system that a three-judge court creates is
outweighed by the beneficial effect it has on federal-state relations.” Id.
37 Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 142 (summarizing Congressional testimony of
Judges Friendly and Wright). My account of the rationale for the apportionment
exception particularly benefits from the insights, both at the time in print, and more
recently by correspondence, of Michael J. Mullen, who from 1971 to 1976 served as the
Deputy Counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee, and later as counsel to Sen. Phillip
Hart (D.-MI), and was closely involved in the hearings for and the drafting of the
legislation that culminated in the 1976 Act. See Michael J. Mullen, Improving Judicial
Administration by Repealing the Requirements of the Three-Judge District Court, 20 CATH.
LAW. 372 (1974). With regard to Judges Friendly and Wright, see Email from Michael
Mullen, Sr. to Michael E. Solimine, Feb. 12, 2018, 3:27 PM (on file with author) (“From
everything I saw and heard, the primary motivation for preserving three-judge courts
in reapportionment litigation in both the Senate and the House was that such cases
‘were qualitatively more important and more difficult than other public law cases…’
The blessing of liberal Judge Wright and judicially conservative Judge Friendly simply
sealed the deal.”) (quoting Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 145.).
38 Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 144 (quoting Judiciary Committee reports that
accompanied passage of the legislation).
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its one-person-one-vote progeny, while uncontroversial today (as
even the Chief Justice seemed to concede in Rucho),39 were still a sore
point in some quarters only fourteen years after that decision.40 Also,
the Congressional supporters of the legislation appeared to share the
ALI’s concern with the perception of the partisan affiliation of single
district judges playing, rightly or not, an outside role in the
perception of the holdings of these cases. The drafters also appeared
to assume that the exception would be a narrow one, and not be the
source of a large number of direct appeals to the Supreme Court. 41
Chief Justice Roberts’ concern with the perceived politization of
the federal judiciary presumably includes lower court judges.42 What
is the record in that regard since 1976? As Table 1 indicates, 43
reapportionment cases before three-judge courts have regularly been
convened in fairly large numbers in the first few years of each of the
past two decades, due to the decennial redrawing of legislative
districts due to the Census. These courts have had to decide
constitutional challenges to the redistricting, as well as associated
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39 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2501 (“But the one-person, one-vote rule is relatively easy to
administer as a matter of math.”).
40 See Solimine, Congress, supra note 25, at 145 (outlining the controversy about Baker
after it was decided.).
41 Id. See also email from Michael Mullen, Sr. to Michael E. Solimine, July 18, 2019,
10:01PM (on file with author) (noting that there was concern, absent retention of the
three-judge district court, a single judge’s decision “might be skewed if a case heard
by a single judge picked by lottery in a multi-judge US district court [either a very
liberal or very conservative district judge]—so a State’s new Congressional map
would or might reflect a role of the dice.”) (brackets in original) [hereinafter Mullen,
2019 email].
42 Tara Leigh Grove, Sacrificing Legitimacy in a Hierarchical Judiciary, 121 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), archived at https://perma.cc/Y43N-5446 (discussing how
changes in Supreme Court doctrine may increase focus on lower federal court judges
when implanting that doctrine, which in turn may concentrate political and interest
group pressure on the composition of the lower courts, though not specifically
addressing Chief Justice Roberts’ views).
43 Tables are provided at the end of this article.
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Voting Rights Act (VRA) claim. 44 Have these cases been
characterized by partisan decision-making? That issue plays out on
several dimensions.
First consider how the Chief Judges of the Circuits constitute the
three-judge panels. One survey of the Chief Judges conducted
twenty-five years ago suggested that neutral principles of judicial
administration (if judges were from the state in question, their
workload, etc.) were the predominate reasons for selection, though
on at least some occasions partisan balance was also taken into
account.45 In practice, most three-judge panels did not consist solely
of jurists appointed by Presidents from one party. 46 More recent
studies have largely confirmed the conclusion that Chief Judges do
not appear to be overtly stacking three-judge district courts with
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44 While three-judge district courts cannot be convened to hear VRA claims alone,
Chestnut v. Merrill, 356 F. Supp.3d 1351 (N.D. Ala. 2019), they can decide the latter
issues when they are pendent or supplemental to constitutional claims. Solimine,
Voting Rights, supra note 27, at 96; Thomas v. Bryant, 938 F.3d 134, 144-48 (5th Cir. 2019).
For examples, see Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S.
30 (1986).
45 Solimine, Voting Rights, supra note 27, at 113.
46 Id. at 140 (tbl.5). Judge Friendly, no fan of the three-judge district court, nonetheless
argued that a mixed partisan balance among its members should be required. Id. at 135.
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jurists of like partisan persuasion, using the rough proxy 47 of the
same party of the appointing President. 48
To be sure, the apparent lack of overt stacking does not alone
mean that three-judge district courts (or at least two members
thereof) are not acting in partisan ways, or are not perceived to be so.
The subject is difficult to study, since it is not always clear to judges
how much any given redistricting map under review will help or
hurt the fortunes of a political party.49 This in turn makes it difficult
to measure how any given three-judge panel, or individual members
thereof, are voting to supposedly advance the partisan interests of
the party of the President that appointed them. 50 That said, consider
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47 It is a rough proxy, since Presidents typically appoint a small number of judges
associated the other political party, and relatedly some judges (especially for the
district courts) are from the other party where one or both Senators from a state are
from the other party, and by tradition Presidents have typically (though not always)
shown deference to Senatorial input in this regard. Students of federal judicial
behavior have attempted to account for such complexities by using more subtle
proxies for partisanship, other than the party of the appointing President, such as the
“common-space” scores of Senators from the state of the appointment, which measure
the partisanship of those officials. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space,
23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303 (2007) (explaining how a variety of methods for assessing
partisanship of government officials, including judges, work).
48 See Stephen L. Wasby, Naming Judges: Three-Judge District Courts in Redistricting
7, 34 (2018) (manuscript on file with author) (study of 127 cases from the 1990, 2000,
and 2010 redistricting rounds, concluding that Chief Judges are not overall stacking
panels with judges appointed by Presidents of the same party as they).
49 The posited difficulty of prediction suggested in the text may now be anachronistic
in many instances, given the ability of map-drawers using sophisticated statistical
techniques to identify like-minded voters and create legislative district lines
accordingly. See Michal Altman & Michael McDonald, The Promise and Perils of
Computers in Redistricting, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 70 (2010) (outlining, among
other things, the potential issues with predicting the results of redistricting); Rucho,
139 S. Ct. at 2513 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
50 For studies of decision-making by three-judge district courts that grapple with these
methodological problems, see Randall D. Lloyd, Separating Partisanship from Party in
Judicial Research: Reapportionment in the U.S. District Courts, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 413
(1995) (study of decisions from 1964 to 1983); Mark Jonathan McKenzie, The Influence
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as a small case study the partisan composition and results of threejudge partisan gerrymandering district court decisions from 2016 to
2019. In all five cases there was a mixed partisan balance, and in all
five the plaintiffs prevailed, with unanimous decisions in three of the
five.51
It is nonetheless difficult to conclude that these three-judge
district courts were acting in partisan ways, or perceived as doing so,
as feared by Chief Justice Roberts. On the other hand, perhaps these
decisions (and prior ones going back to Baker v. Carr) would have
been perceived as more political had they not been litigated before
three-judge district courts.
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of Partisanship, Ideology, and the Law on Redistricting Decisions in the Federal Courts, 65
POL. RES. Q. 799 (2012) (study of decisions from 1981 to 2007); Jordan Carr Peterson,
The Mask of Neutrality: Judicial Partisan Calculation and Legislative Redistricting, 41 LAW
& POL’Y 336 (2019) (study of federal and state decisions from 2000 to 2012). The
availability of direct review to the Supreme Court, further discussed infra, to a degree
can be considered a potential restraint on the alleged politicized decision-making by
members of the three-judge court, at least to the extent those judges take into account
the possibility of review and reversal by the Court. See Maxwell Mak & Andrew H.
Sidman, Separate Opinion Writing Under Mandatory Jurisdiction: Three-Judge District
Court Panels and the Voting Rights Act, 17 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 116, 122-23 (2020);
Solimine, Voting Rights, supra note 27, at 109.
51 The three unanimous decisions and their judges (with R and D representing a judge
appointed by a Republican or Democratic President, respectively) were Benisek v.
Lamone, 348 F. Supp.3d 493 (D. Md. 2018) (three-judge court) (Niemeyer) (R), Bredar
(D), and Russell (D); A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. Householder, 373 F. Supp.3d 978 (S.D.
Ohio 2019) (three-judge court) (Moore (D), Black (D), and Watson (R); and League of
Women Voters v. Benson, 373 F. Supp. 867 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (three-judge court) (Clay
(D), Hood (D), and Quist (R). The two nonunanimous decisions were Gill v. Whitford,
218 F. Supp.3d 837 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (three-judge court) (Ripple (R) and Crabb (D) in
majority, Griesbach (R) in dissent), and Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp.3d 777 (D.
Md. 2018) (three-judge court) (Wynn (D) and Britt (D) in majority, and Osteen (R) in a
partial dissent). Only the last case was strictly on party lines, using the proxy of the
party of the appointing President. Information on the appointing Presidents is
available at https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges. All of the cases but Benisek
involved gerrymanders drawn by Republican dominated legislatures.

42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 96 Side A

2020]

11/10/2020 10:33:17

PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING

185

And perhaps Rucho should have given weight to the
Congressional determination in 1976 that apportionment cases,
including those involving partisan gerrymanders, should continue to
be litigated in three-judge district courts. At first this may seem
irrelevant, since the political question doctrine inquiry seems purely
one for the Supreme Court itself to make.52 But one can argue that the
1976 Act is an implicit Congressional judgment that gerrymanders
are in effect not political questions, since Congress left intact a
separate and special Article III tribunal to hear them. I am not
arguing that the 1976 Act displaces the political question doctrine
criteria, only that the Court’s application of those criteria could have
been informed, in this instance, by the existing institutional
structure.53 Put another way, the analysis of the Rucho majority seems
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52 The political question doctrine cases, and the considerable scholarly literature on
point, seem to say little if anything about how jurisdictional statutes (or lack thereof)
might bear on the presence or absence of a political question. For a rare example of the
Court obliquely addressing this issue, see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004)
(Scalia, J.,) (plurality) (suggesting in that political question inquiry does not depend
on “whatever Congress chooses to assign” to the federal courts.) (emphasis in original).
Martin Redish, a critic of the judicial abstention doctrines on the ground that they
improperly contravene Congressional statutes which vest jurisdiction in federal
courts, see Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers and the Limits of the Judicial
Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984), has allowed that “[t]heoretically, …the same argument
could be made against the political question doctrine.” Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Review and the “Political Question,” 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1045 n.78 (1985). For an
overview of the literature responding to Redish on judicial abstention, regarding
whether and to what extent Congressional statutes can be read to permit the decline
of jurisdiction, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1105-06 (7th ed. 2015).
53 Cf. Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts,
and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 434-35 (2019) (arguing that “Congress has
made the policy decision to leave intact the three-judge district court, with its unusual
direct appeal, for reapportionment” cases, and the Court should respect that policy
choice in interpreting and applying the direct appeal mechanism). To be sure,
redistricting and resulting litigation has changed from the 1970s to the present, and
gerrymandering done on an explicitly partisan basis is a relatively recent

42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 96 Side B

186

11/10/2020 10:33:17

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 14:171

largely an exercise in institutional formalism. Applying the political
question criteria through the lens of institutional realism could have
led the Court to consider the history of the litigation of
gerrymandering cases, political and otherwise, in the lower federal
courts. That could have informed its analysis of the judicially
manageable standards prong of the doctrine.
B. DIRECT APPEALS OF THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT
DECISIONS
Another unique feature of litigation before three-judge district
courts troubled Chief Justice Roberts and may have affected his
decision in Rucho. As already noted, the 1910 legislation provided for
direct appeals of three-judge district court decisions to the Supreme
Court to permit prompt resolution of important cases involving the
constitutionality of state (and later federal) laws. This was not
changed by the 1976 legislation. In no less than three recent oral

Professor Shapiro makes the point even more strongly:
The history [of the reapportionment exception] demonstrates, however, that
to the extent that some Justices believed that the Court’s mandatory
jurisdiction was a reason not to find partisan gerrymandering claims
justiciable, they had it exactly backwards. The mandatory jurisdiction is
both a sign of the significance that Congress has placed on reapportionment
litigation and a reminder that the Court does not alone control its
jurisdiction.
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Shapiro, Docket Control, supra note 31, at 313 (footnote omitted).
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phenomenon. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Dance of Partisanship and
Districting, 13 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 507 (2019). See also Mullen, 2019 email, supra note
41 (the drafters of the 1976 Act “did not foresee the subsequent developments in
reapportionment activities of the States and the ‘weaponizing’ of gerrymandering. I
do not recall any such worries or discussion along those lines.”) But reapportionment
litigation has been controversial and contentious in all of its iterations, and the
Congressional judgment in 1976 in my view should carry some weight before
divesting federal courts of only one type of that litigation.
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arguments of direct appeals of partisan gerrymandering cases, the
Chief Justice and other Justices have openly expressed concerns
about the effect of direct appeals in these cases.54 For example, during
oral argument in Gill v. Whitford, the Chief Justice argued that if
partisan gerrymandering suits are
allowed to proceed, there will naturally be a lot of these
claims raised around the country….And every one of them
will come here for a decision on the merits. These cases are
not within our discretionary jurisdiction. They’re the
mandatory jurisdiction. We will have to decide in every case
whether the Democrats win or the Republicans win. So it’s
going to be a problem here across the board….And the
intelligent man on the street is going to say…[that it] must
be because the Supreme Court preferred the Democrats over
the Republicans. And that’s going to come out one case after
another as these cases are brought in every state. And that is
going to cause very serious harm to the status and integrity
of the decisions of this Court in the eyes of the country.55
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54 Earlier the Chief Justice expressed very similar concerns regarding the then-frequent
direct appeals from three-judge district courts regarding the constitutionality of
various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. Richard L. Hasen, Election
Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn but With Speed Bumps
and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1621-22 (2016).
55 Transcript of Oral Argument at 36-38, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 161161).
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Similar concerns were expressed by the Chief Justice during oral
argument in Shapiro v. McManus, where he added that the direct
appeals would not allow the Court to permit an issue to percolate in
the lower courts, as it does with cases that come to the Court on
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discretionary writs of certiorari. 56 Not oblivious to these concerns,
Paul Clement, the former Solicitor General who was now the
attorney of record for the defendants in Rucho, brought up the issue
on his own during oral argument.57
Are the concerns about direct appeals raised by the Chief Justice
well-taken? At oral argument in Rucho, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
argued that the same concerns were raised in the wake of the oneperson-one-vote cases at the outset of the Reapportionment
Revolution, that courts would be “flooded with cases and they’ll
never be able to get out of it. That’s not what happened.” 58 It’s not
clear if Justice Ginsburg was referring to the convening of threejudge district courts, or direct appeals resulting therefrom, or both,
but either way she is correct. There were a large number of cases filed
in the wake of Baker v. Carr and other Supreme Court decisions, but
they were fairly quickly resolved, given the relative ease of judicial
application of the one-person-one-vote rule, and the flood abated by
the late 1960s.59
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S. Ct. 450 (2016) (No. 14990). The Court in Gill remanded for further proceedings to permit the plaintiffs to
properly demonstrate that they had standing to bring suit. The suit was pending in
the district court when Rucho was decided. The Court in Shapiro, an earlier iteration of
the Benisek case that was decided in Rucho, held that a three-judge district court had to
be convened to decide the threshold question of whether a partisan gerrymandering
claim had been properly pleaded. Josh Douglas and I filed an amicus curiae brief in
Shapiro arguing for the result the Court reached.
57 Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2482 (No. 18422).
58 Id. at 36.
59 Walter Olson, The Ghost Ship of Gerrymandering Law, 2017-2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
59, 68; Michael E. Solimine, Congress, the Solicitor General, and the Path of
Reapportionment Litigation, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1109, 1136 (2012) [hereinafter
Solimine, Reapportionment]; See also RICHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES
192 & n.1 (1970) (pointing out that in the wake of six one-person-one-vote cases, from
six states, decided by the Supreme Court in 1964, the Court disposed of nine direct
appeals from other states by summary orders, without oral argument).
56
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On the other hand, it’s not clear what fate would be in store had
Rucho gone the other way. By many accounts, redistricting for
Congress and state legislatures had been particularly partisan in the
wake of the 2010 census, 60 and this would seem to portend a large
number of suits with resulting direct appeals. It would seem that
many such cases could not be as easily disposed as the one-personone-vote cases fifty years ago, given the difficulties of formulating a
judicial standard to determine how much partisan gerrymandering
is too much, a point heavily emphasized by the majority in Rucho.61
Perhaps that fear can be overstated. The Chief Justice earlier
expressed concerns that direct appeals would prevent helpful
percolation of this very issue. In spite of that, one can argue that
percolation of judicial standards on this topic had in effect taken
place. As the Rucho majority itself acknowledged, the Court itself had
been grappling with partisan gerrymandering decisions as far back
as the 1970s, with several cases before the most recent ones.62 Even in
the most recent iteration, no less than five three-judge district courts,
after trials, issued decisions addressing at length the proper
standards to apply, with the courts then applying those very
standards,63 a point emphasized by Justice Elena Kagan in her Rucho
dissent. 64 Objectively determining the benefits of percolation is a
42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 98 Side A
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See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, Partisan Gerrymandering: Weeds in the Political Thicket,
101 SOC. SCI. Q. 23, 26 (2019); Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, atϭϳϵͲϴϬ.
61 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2499-2506.
62 Id. at 2497-98 (discussing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)). For further discussion of these cases,
see Engstrom, supra note 60; Olson, supra note 59.
63 See cases cited in note 51 supra.
64 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2516-17 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see Vieth, 541 U.S. at 280-83
(plurality) (surveying three-judge district court decisions applying Bandemer and
finding them not helpful in developing standards to adjudicate partisan
gerrymandering).
60
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difficult task,65 but to the extent it is beneficial, it seems to have taken
place even in this regime of direct appeals.66
Another aspect of the Chief Justice’s reticence about direct
appeals is largely of the Court’s own making. Recall that Chief Justice
Roberts said every such appeal comes to the Court for a “decision on
the merits.” 67 That is true, but it requires some explanation. The
Court’s long-standing practice, almost from the inception of direct
appeals from three-judge district courts over 100 years ago, is to
dispose of all such appeals in a way that resembles the certiorari
process. For many and indeed most such appeals, the Court will
simply summarily affirm, with a brief order and no explanatory
opinion. Presumably this is because the Court is satisfied with the
lower court’s resolution of the case. Otherwise, the Court will set the
appeal for full briefing and oral argument, and issue an explanatory
decision, as it does with cases where certiorari is granted.68
Hence a summary disposition of a direct appeal and a denial of
certiorari might seem very similar. But there is one crucial difference:
the Court has long stated that denials of certiorari are not entitled to
any precedential weight, by lower courts or on the Court itself. 69 In
contrast, since the 1970s the Court has held that even summary
affirmances of direct appeals are entitled to be treated to some degree
42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 98 Side B
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65 There is a large literature critiquing the putative benefits of percolation. See Seth
Davis & Michael Coenen, Percolation’s Value, 73 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript on file with author); Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized
Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 U. PA. J. CON. L. 115, 143-48 (2014) [hereinafter
Specialized Courts].
66 Solimine, Specialized Courts, supra note 65, at 146-47 (discussing how some
percolation can exist even with direct appeals, using litigation from three-judge
district courts deciding challenges to various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002 as an example).
67 See note 55 supra.
68 STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 4-74—4-87 (11th ed. 2019)
[hereinafter SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE].
69 Id. at 4-80—4-81.
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as precedent, at least for cases that are substantially similar, though
not as much as for fully articulated decisions.70 This might suggest to
the Chief Justice that had Rucho gone the other way, the Court could
not easily have used summary affirmances (or reversals) to dispose
of the predicted flood of direct appeals. Knowing that even summary
dispositions have precedential effect, the Court would presumably
have to devote time to carefully examine each such appeal.
A related concern is that given the lack of intermediate appellate
review, the Court itself needs to undertake the task in the first
instance of reviewing the record before the three-judge district court.
Normally the findings of fact would be subject to deferential, clearlyerroneous review,71 but the Court itself has suggested that in these
situations less deferential review is appropriate given the lack of an
intermediate court. 72 Presumably this more rigorous review, if
undertaken conscientiously, places yet another burden on the Court,
largely absent in other cases.73
Josh Douglas and I have suggested a way to deal with the
problems associated with direct review, if problems they are. We
acknowledge that certiorari and direct appeals are not and should
not be identical; the Court is “under some obligation to resolve a

71
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Id.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6).
72 Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001). Subsequently the Court seems to have
backed away from the Easley analysis, and has held that in this context “clear error”
review is appropriate, which appears to be close if not identical to the Rule 52(a)(6)
standard. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1464-65 (2017); id. at 1485-86 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
73 For further discussion of the standards of appellate review in this context, see
Melissa L. Saunders, A Cautionary Tale: Hunt v. Cromartie and the Next Generation of
Shaw Litigation, 1 ELECTION L.J. 173 (2002); Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process,
Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
767, 787-88 (2007).
70
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[direct appeal] on the merits.”74 Some appeals could be set for full
briefing and argument, with an explanatory decision to follow. Still
other appeals could be disposed of with a brief explanation, which
could be given such precedential weight as is warranted. 75 And the
Court could still use summary dispositions, but rather than continue
the current confusing practice of giving cryptic, usually one-line
orders with some (but not full) precedential effect, the Court could
simply not give them precedential effect at all. These options would
permit the Court to rationally deal with direct appeals, whether they
appear in a flood or a trickle or somewhere in-between.76
Problems with direct appeals are exacerbated by the Court’s
shrunken docket (i.e., the cases decided on the merits) in the past two
decades. It is not clear why the docket has shrunken to about 75 to 80
from almost double that number as recently as the 1970s. At least part
of the reason is likely the significant restriction of the jurisdiction of
the three-judge district court, and related statutory eliminations of
mandatory (direct) appeals.77 One perhaps unintended consequence
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74 Douglas & Solimine, supra note 53, at 424 (footnote omitted). Congress’ very use of
the word “appeal,” see 28 U.S.C. § 1253, suggests that “the losing party may obtain
review on the merits by a higher court as of right, not merely a discretionary
determination as to whether the higher court will consider the case.” SHAPIRO,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 65, at 4-74—4-75.
75 The Court has issued brief explanations for some summary affirmances of direct
appeals, going as far back as the 1920s. Douglas & Solimine, supra note 53, at 432 &
n.122. For a recent example, see North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548 (2018) (per
curiam) (in direct appeal of racial gerrymandering case, providing several pages of
explanation while summarily affirming in part and reversing in part).
76 Douglas & Solimine, supra note 53, at 431-38.
77 For discussion, see Michael Heise et al., Does Docket Size Matter? Revisiting Empirical
Accounts of the Supreme Court’s Incredibly Shrinking Docket, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1567,
1573-74, 1583 (2020); Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court,
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 403, 408-12; Kenneth Moffett et al., Strategic Behavior and Variation
in the Supreme Court’s Caseload Over Time, 37 JUST. SYS. J. 20, 33 (2016); Ryan J. Owens
& David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1219, 1278-79 (2012).
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of the smaller docket is that it has elevated the perceived importance
of, and controversy attached to, the cases that manage to reach the
docket. 78 As Table 2 indicates, the Court has decided few direct
appeals from district courts (almost all of them being from threejudge courts) in the past ten years, only several each Term. Still, the
specter of a flood of direct appeals dominating a smallish docket may
have haunted the Chief Justice in Rucho. That predicted flood may
have been less startling if the Court had a larger docket each Term.
II. THE SOCIAL NETWORK OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING IN
THE SUPREME COURT

11/10/2020 10:33:17

Charles Gardner Geyh, Considering Reconsidering Judicial Independence, 168 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 35, 42-43 (2019).
79 Fontana & Huq, supra note 8, at 63.
80 Id. (footnote omitted).
81 For discussion of related factors, see Hasen, supra note 54, at 1618-23 (discussing
strategy of litigants when using mandatory appeal provisions); Lisa Marshall
Manheim, Redistricting Litigation and the Delegation of Democratic Design, 93 B.U. L. REV.
563 (2013) (critique of power litigants have in the resolution of redistricting litigation).
78
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Fontana and Huq also argue that institutional loyalty should be
viewed in the context of “wider social networks…that police
adherence to institutional norms while at the same time providing
legitimation and public support.”79 “Such networks,” they continue,
“are particularly robust in respect to the Article III judiciary…The
chief justice, and the Court as a whole, is embedded in a larger social
network of commentators, think tanks, scholars, and lawyers, largely
located inside the Beltway.”80 A full survey of those factors as they
apply to Rucho is beyond the scope of this Article. 81 Instead I will
focus on one factor, widely followed in legal circles and presumed
by many to have some influence on the Justices: the number,
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authorship and arguments raised by amicus curiae briefs in the
Court.
A. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS IN THE SUPREME COURT

11/10/2020 10:33:17

The classic account of the change in the orientation of amicus briefs is Samuel
Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963).
For an overview of the now large scholarly literature on amicus briefs, see Paul M.
Collins, Jr., The Use of Amicus Briefs, 14 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 219 (2018).
83 See Paul M. Collins, Jr., FRIENDS OF THE SUPREME COURT: INTEREST GROUPS AND
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING (2008); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The
Influence of Amicus Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743 (2000).
84 Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About Elites, Not the
American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1566-68 (2010).
82
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Amicus curiae, or friend-of-the-court, briefs, have a long history
in the Supreme Court and other courts. As the name suggests, these
briefs were used to bring relatively objective information and
arguments to a court’s attention, not necessarily to support a given
side—in the twentieth century, however, most such briefs came to
overtly support one of the parties. In the last couple of decades of the
last century, the number of amicus briefs filed in the Supreme Court
began to rise, such that now almost all cases have at least one such
brief filed, with high-profile cases having scores filed.82
The Justices themselves have apparently been cognizant of and
indeed contributed to this trend, by citing and relying upon these
briefs in their opinions. 83 The Justices, it has been argued, rely on
such briefs to gauge public opinion in general and elite attitudes in
particular.84 A variety of reasons account for the rise in the number
of and apparent influence of amicus briefs in the Supreme Court.
These include the Court’s policies of liberally granting leave for the
filing of such briefs; more interest groups following Court decisions
and filing briefs; an apparently rising perception of the importance
of Court decisions, perhaps one accentuated by the Court’s smaller
docket; and express efforts by the parties to suits where review is
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granted to encourage outside groups to file amicus briefs in their
favor.85
These trends have continued unabated in the Roberts Court. For
example, in the 2018-19 Term in which Rucho was handed down,
more than 700 amicus briefs were filed, including in almost all of the
cases decided on the merits, and one or more amicus briefs were cited
in over half of the decisions.86 As in past years, the Court frequently
cited and seemed to give particular weight to amicus briefs filed by
the Solicitor General of the United States and state attorneys general,
both of whom are permitted by Court rule to file such briefs in any
case, without needing the permission of the Court or of the parties.87
Indeed, now that so many amicus briefs have been filed for so long,
some argue that “their power as an explanatory variable” of apparent
influence on judicial decisions has been reduced.88
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For discussion of these factors, see Collins, supra note 82, at 220-24; Allison Orr
Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. 1901 (2016).
86 Anthony J. Franze & R. Reeves Anderson, A Calm but Impressive 2018-19 Term for
‘Friends of the Court’, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 28, 2019, archived at https://perma.cc/8UHNX6E5. Indeed, if “anything, friends of the court were quieter in 2018-19 than in recent
terms, which have seen a record number of briefs and the highest level of amicus
participation in history.” Id. For his part, Chief Justice Roberts cited amicus briefs in
an average of 39% percent of his majority opinions, and 36% of his concurring or
dissenting opinions. Id.
87 Sp. Ct. R. 37.4. On the influence of these briefs, see Kayla S. Canelo, State Coalitions,
Informational Signals, and Success as Amicus Curiae at the U.S. Supreme Court, 20 ST. POL.
& POL’Y Q. 108 (2020); Franze & Anderson, supra note 86; Richard L. Pacelle Jr. et al.,
The Influence of the Solicitor General as Amicus Curiae on the Roberts Court, 2005-2014: A
Research Note, 38 JUS. SYS. J. 202 (2017).
88 Richard L. Pacelle, Jr. et al., Assessing the Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Roberts Court, 99 SOC. SCI. Q. 1253, 1263 (2018) (study of amicus briefs filed in 2005
through 2014 Terms).
85
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B. AMICUS CURIAE BRIEFS AND RUCHO
Thirty-nine amicus briefs were filed in Rucho, 89 far below the
record numbers of such briefs that other high-profile case had
attracted in recent Terms. Ten were filed in support of the defendant,
twenty-six in favor of the plaintiff, and two in favor of neither side. 90
Nicholas Stephanopoulos has emphasized that conservative or
Republican entities or state officials were the only ones that
advocated for the result reached in Rucho, 91 which is true, but
liberal/Democratic and conservative/Republican dichotomies
characterize most amicus briefs filed in a given case. As
Stephanopoulos points out, a variety of conservative organizations
or Republican party-linked committees or entities filed in favor of the
defendants, as well as ten Red States (to use modern parlance) joining
in one brief.92 In a similar fashion, the amici supporting the plaintiffs
were mostly law professors, political scientists, interest groups (e.g.,
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See the listing of briefs at scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/rucho-v-commoncause/. In the companion case of Lamone v. Benisek, 22 amicus briefs were filed, see
scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/lamone-v-benisek/, most of which were cross filed
for Rucho, and the reverse was true as well. For simplicity sake I will focus on the briefs
filed in Rucho.
90 For a summary of the arguments made by the briefs, see Brennan Center for Justice,
Annotated Guide to Amicus Briefs in Rucho v. Common Cause, archived at
https://perma.cc/QCD6-FF3G.
91 Stephanopoulos, supra note 3, at 178-79.
92 The States mentioned here and below all had Republican, or Democratic, state
attorneys general, respectively. Almost always the state attorney general, usually
separately elected, will decide whether or not the state files or joins in an amicus brief,
rather than the governor or the state legislature, who may be of the other party. This
can cause problems in characterizing a State amicus as representing a particular
political party. See Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the
Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 384-85 (2012) [hereinafter
Solimine, State Amici].
89
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the ACLU and NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund), and 21
Blue States and the District of Columbia joining in one brief. 93
At least two briefs supporting the plaintiffs had a bipartisan
flavor. One was by the former Republican governor of California,
Arnold Schwarzenegger, and the current Republican governor of
Maryland, Larry Hogan. Another was by a self-described bipartisan
group of past and current members of the U.S. House of
Representatives.
Perhaps more surprising however, given the high-profile nature
and political valence of the case, was one potential amicus brief that
was not filed: that of the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court has a
long history of soliciting input from the Solicitor General as an
amicus, given the positions acknowledged and long-standing
expertise, with the Court deferring to his or her views on a variety of
issues, no matter the party of the President.94 Relevant to this Article,
it is frequently said that the amicus brief filed by the Kennedy
Administration in support of the plaintiffs in Baker v. Carr played a
significant role in the majority’s holding that the suit was not barred
by the political question doctrine.95 Solicitor Generals of both
Democratic and Republican Administrations have since frequently
filed amicus briefs in subsequent redistricting cases involving one42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A
11/10/2020 10:33:17

93 As a matter of convenience, I acknowledge making broad generalizations here. For
example, not all liberals or conservatives, however one may define those terms, are
necessarily affiliated with the Democratic or Republican parties, respectively.
Nonetheless, the generalizations make the point about the political or partisan
orientation of many of the amicus briefs filed.
94 RYAN C. BLACK & RYAN J. OWEN, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: EXECUTIVE BRANCH INFLUENCE AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS (2012);
Michael E. Solimine, The Solicitor General Unbound: Amicus Curiae Activism and
Deference in the Supreme Court, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1183 (2013) [hereinafter Solimine,
Solicitor General].
95 Solimine, Reapportionment, supra note 59, at 1121-22 (referring to many sources that
attribute influence to the filing of the brief and to Solicitor General Archibald Cox’s
oral argument, but noting that the brief was not cited in any of the opinions).
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person-one-vote or race,96 but they have conspicuously not done so
in partisan gerrymandering cases. 97 The reasons are not clear; one
recent account suggests that the decision has not been fully
addressed by any Solicitor General, other than relying on the notion
that the federal interest justifying amicus intervention in these cases
is attenuated. 98 Another relevant factor might be that Solicitor
Generals of both parties felt that partisan gerrymandering claims are
politically taboo, and better left alone.99
What role did these amicus briefs play in Rucho? In this or any
other case, we cannot be sure. Simply because one or more amicus
briefs are cited in the opinion does not necessarily mean that they
were particularly influential. Likewise, even if the brief is not cited,
the Solicitor General’s support for one position and arguments may
have influenced the Justices and the scope of doctrine. 100 With those
caveats, it might seem that the amicus briefs did not have much
influence. For the majority, Chief Justice Roberts briefly cited two
such briefs while discussing what he saw as the too-vague liability
standards advanced by plaintiffs. 101 Justice Kagan’s dissent similarly
cited two amicus briefs on what standards were appropriate, 102 but

97
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Id. at 1125-28.
Id. at 1128 n.101. In the LULAC case, supra note 62, the Solicitor General did file an
amicus brief, but on the issue of the Voting Rights Act, and not on partisan
gerrymandering. Id.
98 Darcy Covert & A.J. Wang, The Loudest Voice at the Supreme Court: The Solicitor
General’s Dominance of Oral Argument, VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming), archived at
https://perma.cc/RCG6-BVSX. Covert and Wang interviewed attorneys at the Office
of the Solicitor General, one of whom noted that the Attorney General had been a party
to one of the racial gerrymandering cases (Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)), and the
office has continued to participate as amicus in those cases, even though “the federal
government now does not really have a role.” Id.
99 Solimine, Reapportionment, supra note 59, at 1128 & n.101.
100 Solimine, Solicitor General, supra note 94, at 1191-94.
101 Rucho, 139 S. Ct. at 2500.
102 Id. at 2518-19 (Kagan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2525 (citing amicus brief filed in
Gill v. Whitford).
96
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also the brief by the bipartisan legislators on what they deemed the
negative effects of partisan gerrymandering. 103
Or it might be said that these briefs influenced the Court all too
well. Since the Justices voted in Rucho on what was perceived in some
quarters as strictly along partisan and ideologically lines themselves,
it might be considered a reflection, as Stephanopoulos argued, of the
Justices following ideologically elite opinions that mirrored their
own. This latter view is bolstered by the fact that most of the briefs
fell on what can be perceived as conventional conservative/liberal
lines. Had there been more bipartisan briefs, or had the briefs,
bipartisan or not, overwhelmingly supported one side, perhaps the
result might had been different. Such a larger and politically
heterogeneous filing of state amici could have signaled to the Court
that partisan gerrymandering suits would be a welcome bipartisan
solution.104 It is noteworthy that 31 States participated as amici, but
only along strictly partisan lines,105 and that the Solicitor General did
not participate. 106 Or perhaps the ideological effect of the amicus

104
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Id. at 2525.
See Lucia Manzi & Matthew E.K. Hall, Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of
Interest Group Litigation Before the Supreme Court, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 704, 709-11
(2017); Solimine, State Amici, supra note 92, at 391-93. But see Canelo, supra note 87, at
120 (study of state amici briefs filed in Supreme Court from 1960 to 2013 did not show
that ideologically heterogeneous briefs were more influential).
105 See also Lisa F. Grumet, Hidden Nondefense: Partisanship in State Attorneys General
Amicus Briefs and the Need for Transparency, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1859, 1865-67 (2019)
(pointing out that a total of 33 states filed two amicus briefs in Whitford v. Gill, with all
the Republican-associated states filing one brief supporting defendants, and all
Democratic-associated states filing the other brief supporting the plaintiffs).
106 It may or not be relevant that a few months after Rucho was decided, Attorney
General William P. Barr, in a speech at an annual meeting of the Federalist Society,
supported the holding. See William P. Barr, The Role of the Executive, 43 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 605, 625 (2020) (footnote omitted) (“And just last term, the Supreme Court
appropriately shut the door to claims that otherwise-lawful redistricting can violate
the Constitution if the legislators who drew the lines were actually motivated by
political partisanship.”).
103
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briefs is overstated, and that the Court as a whole now has some
amicus curiae fatigue.107
CONCLUSION
This Article has critiqued Rucho from an institutional loyalty
perspective, focusing on whether Chief Justice Robert’s opinion for
the majority can be explained, at least in part, as his effort to protect,
as he saw it, the Supreme Court and other federal courts from the
perception of being political actors. 108 Yet it is not too difficult to
engage in effectively the mirror image of that critique had the
decision gone the other way. Recall that partisan gerrymanders
drawn by Democratic and Republican legislatures in separate states
were before the Court, seemingly giving the Court a golden
opportunity to act in a perceptible even-handed manner. If a majority
of the Court had held instead that partisan gerrymandering suits are
not nonjusticiable political questions, precisely to regulate excessive
partisanship in American government, then it is possible that the
Court would now be hailed as a savior. In this scenario, a bipartisan
majority of the Court would have intervened, in a case involving
gerrymanders drawn by both political parties, to limit largely
Republican-led gerrymandering after the 2010 census. 109 That is
42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 103 Side B

While the Chief Justice has cited amicus briefs at a similar rate to other Justices, see
Franze & Anderson, note 86 supra, in other cases he has expressed some skepticism
about heavy reliance on such briefs. Michael E. Solimine, Retooling the Amicus Machine,
102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 159 (2016).
108 See generally Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality In a Partisan Era, 70
FLA. L. REV. 739 (2018). It is also worth noting that that “even the public’s confidence
in the Supreme Court, which it has traditional revered, has declined significantly since
the 1980s and is now under 40%.” Peter H. Schuck, Some Sources of Our Political
Discontents, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Winter 2020, at 119, 126.
109 Cf. Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Intervention as Judicial Restraint, 132 HARV. L.
REV. 236, 267-75 (2018) (urging Court to decide case this way, prior to the decision). A
similar dynamic arguably occurred in another case, decided on the same day as Rucho,
107
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essentially what happened in Baker v. Carr and the subsequent oneperson-one-vote cases of the 1960s, which were highly controversial
in some quarters at the time, but rapidly came to be accepted by most
popular and elite opinion alike.110
But that counterfactual is just that. Assuming the Chief Justice
was drawing on, if only subconsciously, norms of institutional
loyalty as he perceived them, should he be applauded or criticized?
Fontana and Huq observe that “[i]nstitutional loyalties within the
federal judiciary might be supposed an unfettered good insofar as”
they support independence from the other branches, thus enhancing
the separation of powers. 111 But they question whether that
assumption is always correct. For purposes of this Article, it is telling
that they label as a “vivid display of an institutional loyalty at work”
the successful lobbying efforts of Chief Justice William Howard Taft
and other members of the Court to convince Congress to pass the
Judges’ Bill in 1925, giving the Court discretionary, certiorari
jurisdiction over most of its docket.112
“Yet it is far from clear,” they continue, “that the fruits of the
discretion achieved by Taft and other advocates for the institutional
judiciary necessarily promote useful constitutional ends.”113 Vesting
such enormous discretion in a Court to almost completely control its
own agenda in a virtually unchecked manner places enormous
42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 104 Side A
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when the Chief Justice authored a majority opinion upholding a challenge to the
insertion of a question about citizenship in the Census. See Dep’t of Commerce v. New
York, 139 S.Ct. 2552 (2019).
110 Olson, supra note 59, at 68; Solimine, Reapportionment, supra note 56, at 1114-17. The
small number of modern critics of Baker v. Carr include Justices Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito. Id. at 116-17 n.39.
111 Fontana & Huq, supra note 8, at 72.
112 Id. at 72-73.
113 Id. at 73.
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power in a very small number of jurists. 114 “Judicial self-regard”115
does not necessarily lead to proper constitutional ends. The Court’s
“institutional interest in stanching the flow of certain kinds of
litigation,” 116 such as partisan gerrymandering cases, deserves
independent examination, even if one concedes that the Court (or
some members thereof) were following institutional loyalty as they
perceived it.
It is no small irony that the direct appeals from three-judge
district courts were a conspicuous exception to the considerable
discretion vested in the Supreme Court by the Judges’ Bill. 117 But as
this Article has demonstrated, some of the unique features of modern
reapportionment litigation in the federal courts was at least
implicitly used by the Court to justify not hearing partisan
gerrymandering suits. If one agrees with the result in Rucho, then
institutional loyalty can provide satisfying descriptive and
normative justifications, though if one advocates those suits should
not be barred by the political question doctrine, those same
justifications prove woefully inadequate.
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114 Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years after
the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1708-10 (2000); see also Matthew J. Franck,
The Problem of Judicial Supremacy, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Spring 2016, at 137, 147-49
(echoing Hartnett’s points about the certiorari process versus mandatory direct
appeals, but not discussing reapportionment cases).
115 Fontana & Huq, supra note 8, at 74.
116 Id. at 73 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
117 Chief Justice Taft was apparently ambivalent about that exception. He variously
urged that all cases be governed by certiorari, but also appeared to be able to tolerate
direct appeals from three-judge district courts, since those were limited to
constitutional issues. Hartnett, supra note 114, at 1661; Solimine, Congress, supra note
25, at 124 n.116.
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TABLE 1
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THREE-JUDGE DISTRICT COURT HEARINGS 1999-2018
CIVIL
YEAR RIGHTS REAPPORTIONMENT OTHER TOTAL
1999
6
3
2
11
2000
3
3
0
6
2001
4
8
0
12
2002
11
27
7
45
2003
5
2
4
11
2004
1
3
2
6
2005
6
4
0
10
2006
7
2
4
13
2007
4
1
8
13
2008
4
1
11
16
2009
3
1
3
7
2010
10
1
0
11
2011
9
11
0
20
2012
13
19
3
35
2013
2
2
2
6
2014
5
6
0
11
2015
2
4
2
8
2016
4
3
0
7
2017
2
7
0
9
2018
0
11
0
11
Sources: Table S-18 of the 2003, 2008, 2013 and 2018 Annual Reports of the Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.
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TABLE 2
DIRECT APPEALS FROM DISTRICT COURTS ON SUPREME
COURT¶S MERITS DOCKET,
2009-2018 TERMS
FULL
MEMORANDUM
TERM
OPINION
ORDER
TOTAL
2009
2
1
3
2010
1
1
2
2011
1
3
4
2012
1
4
5
2013
1
1
2
2014
2
1
3
2015
3
0
3
2016
3
3
6
2017
4
0
4
2018
2
0
2
Source: Totals compiled from Table II of The Statistics in
the November issues of the HARVARD LAW REVIEW. 124

42719-nya_14-1 Sheet No. 105 Side B

Harv. L. Rev. 420 (2010)(2009 Term); 125 Harv. L. Rev. 317
(2011)(2010 Term); 126 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2012)(2011 Term);
127 Harv. L. Rev. 418 (2013)(2012 Term); 128 Harv. L. Rev.
411 (2014)(2013 Term); 129 Harv. L. Rev. 391 (2015)(2014
Term); 130 Harv. L. Rev. 516 (2016)(2015 Term); 131 Harv.
L. Rev. 412 (2017)(2016 Term); 132 Harv. L. Rev. 457
(2018)(2017 Term); 133 Harv. L. Rev. 422 (2019)(2018 Term).
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